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Much human behavior is stimulus-free. While plants and many non-human animals respond 
reflexively to their present environment, our own actions are mediated by our ability to 
represent how the world has been and how it could be, and how we might alter it to achieve 
our goals. Philosophers who have explored the evolutionary pressures giving rise to 
representational cognition, such as Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Sterelny (2003), have emphasized 
the role played by environmental complexity. In his book Efficient Cognition: The Evolution of 
Representational Decision Making, Armin Schulz suggests that an important part of this 
evolutionary story has been overlooked. He argues that representationally-mediated behavior 
is adaptive because it is more cognitively efficient than reflex-driven behavior, under certain 
conditions.  
 
When Schulz argues for the efficiency of representational decision-making, the representations 
in question are theoretical posits of cognitive science: physically-implemented (often 
computational) internal states that are semantically evaluable and causally efficacious; the 
vehicles of representational content (Drayson 2018). Schulz distinguishes between broadly 
belief-like cognitive representations (of the organism’s environment) and broadly desire-like 
conative representations (of the organism’s goals), but this is not a book about propositional 
attitudes or practical reasoning. Schulz is interested in the explanatory and predictive roles that 
representations play in scientific theories of behavior generation, in which there is no 
assumption that their contents are propositional or consciously accessible. But Schulz parts 
ways from cognitive science when he reserves the term ‘representational’ for high-level (i.e. 
non-perceptual, amodal) mental states that can participate in inferential processes: “distinct 
states that are downstream from their perceptual systems” (13). Schulz classifies as reflex-
driven any behavior which is not the result of amodal representations, which puts his approach 
in tension with cognitive science’s commitment to low-level sensory and motor 
representations: consider the representations in computational models of the early visual 
system (Marr 1982), for example, and in comparator models of motor control (Wolpert 1997). 
Schulz also leaves it unclear how his notion of representation applies to different cognitive 
architectures: in a modular architecture, for example, would the representations in an 
encapsulated process (such as theory of mind, or language comprehension) count as being 
“downstream” from perception? And in predictive-processing architectures such as those 
developed by Clark (2013) and Hohwy (2013), the high-level non-perceptual representations 
are arguably upstream from (and not entirely distinct from) perception. Schulz’s approach thus 
seems to work best for so-called “classical sandwich” models of cognitive architecture (Hurley 
1998), on which the explanatory work is done by amodal representations mediating between 
perception and action, and sensory-motor processes are merely inputs and outputs.  
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Two further features of Schulz’s approach are worth emphasizing. Schulz is not concerned with 
the adaptivity of representational thought in general, nor with the adaptivity of a particular 
kind of behavior. He is specifically concerned with showing how the trait of decision-making (in 
both humans and non-humans) can be more cognitively efficient and adaptive when it employs 
internal representations. This relates to the second interesting feature of Schulz’s approach, 
which is a terminological one. While it is common to reserve the term ‘decision-making’ for 
representational thinkers, Schulz extends it to reflex-driven organisms: he describes the 
stimulus-driven behavior of ants, slime molds, and magnetotactic bacteria as the result of a 
non-representational decision-making processes. He advises readers who are uncomfortable 
with this to rephrase such talk in terms of ‘behavior determination processes’. I will come back 
to both of these features below. 
 
At the heart of Schulz’s book is a question: why has representational decision-making evolved? 
Given that many organisms succeed by responding reflexively to environmental stimuli, what 
selection pressures would result in representationally-mediated behavior? Schulz’s answer is 
that non-representational decision-making often involves a certain kind of redundancy which 
representational decision-making lacks. This redundancy occurs when more than one stimulus 
triggers the same behavioral response in a reflex-driven organism: the organism might have 
different ways of detecting a predator (by sight, by smell, by sound, for example) but have the 
same reflexive behavioral response (taking cover) to each kind of stimulus. Schulz points out 
that a table of such an organism’s behavioral dispositions, listing each pairing of a sensory input 
with a behavioral output, could be lengthy; and a network diagram might require many 
connections to track the associations. Schulz argues that the table of behavioral dispositions 
would be significantly shorter, and the network diagram would require fewer connections, if 
the different sensory cues were bundled into one internal representation of their distal cause 
(the predator). Employing representations in this way, Schulz claims, would “streamline 
decision making by allowing the organism to react to grouped perceptual states, rather than to 
the perceptual states themselves”, making them “more cognitively efficient than non-
representational decision makers” (97, author’s italics). 
 
This streamlining of the connections between sensory input and behavioral output, however, is 
not sufficient to establish increased cognitive efficiency. The benefits gained by switching from 
reflexes to representations come with certain costs: a representation-using organism needs 
resources for storing, retrieving, and manipulating those representations. Inferential processes 
like these tend to use more time and cognitive resources than the non-inferential processes 
involved in reflexive processes of behavior determination. Schulz acknowledges this, but claims 
that non-representational decision-makers with large numbers of redundant behavioral 
dispositions can incur even greater costs. He argues that that a non-representational organism 
with “16 different behavioral dispositions to store and consider” (91, my italics) could reduce 
that number to eight by employing representations, concluding that “representational decision 
makers can get away with considering many fewer behavioral dispositions than reflex-based 
organisms have to” (104, my italics). Similarly, he proposes that an organism which can 
represent its goals can rely on just one explicitly-stored behavioral function, whereas the non-
representational organism “relies on a stored table of all the argument-value pairs that make 
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up this function” (121, my italics). Notice that Schulz is directly comparing the kinds of cognitive 
effort expended by representational and non-representational decision-makers: he thinks that 
both kinds of organism make decisions by storing and considering behavioral dispositions, and 
that cognitive efficiency increases where there are fewer dispositions to be stored and 
considered.  
 
This is where Schulz’s preference for referring to reflexive behavior as the result of ‘decision-
making’ might be misleading. It does not seem odd to refer to decision-makers as storing and 
considering information, as Schulz does in the above quotations, until we recall that Schulz’s 
non-representational decision-makers are entirely reflex-driven. As such, they don’t store 
tables of behavioral dispositions or consider which behavioral disposition to engage, at least not 
in the sense that representational organisms store and consider the information they 
represent. There will, of course, be metabolic costs incurred by reflex mechanisms, but it is not 
clear how we should compare these to the genuinely cognitive costs incurred by information-
processing mechanisms that store and manipulate representations. Schulz’s conclusion may be 
right: perhaps the costs associated with a sufficiently large number of reflex connections can be 
outweighed by the benefits of representations. But to evaluate this scenario, we need a more 
detailed account of cognitive efficiency, and an understanding of how to quantify different 
kinds of performance and effort. Should we, for example, calculate cognitive efficiency using a 
deviation model (using subtraction to calculate the difference between performance and effort) 
or a likelihood model (calculating the ratio between performance and effort)? Should we 
measure cognitive performance as an increase in the amount of information, or as in increase 
in the rate of accrual of information? These issues are addressed in the psychological literature 
on cognitive efficiency (see, for example, Hoffman 2012) but Schulz does not engage with them 
in his book. It would be interesting to see his argument re-run using these resources to clarify 
and contextualize the relative efficiency of representational and non-representational decision-
makers.  
 
If Schulz succeeds in showing that representational decision-making can be more cognitively 
efficient than non-representational decision-making, his next task is to show that cognitive 
efficiency contributes to the adaptivity of representational decision-making. His first argument 
for adaptivity claims that a representational decision-maker, in virtue of being more cognitively 
efficient than a non-representational decision-maker, will also be more efficient at altering its 
behavior in response to changes in the environment. Schulz proposes that while the 
representational decision-maker will need time and effort to change its behavioral rules, the 
non-representational decision-maker would need even more time and effort to alter its many 
redundant behavioral dispositions: “changing each behavioral disposition in a table of 
behavioral dispositions takes some time, concentration, attention, and energy” (122). The 
comparison, as before, is perhaps not as straightforward as Schulz suggests. The reflex-driven 
organism does not represent its table of behavioral dispositions, for example, and it is not clear 
why concentration and attention would be required for it to alter its stimulus-driven behavior. 
Schulz’s claims would benefit from a more thorough account of cognitive efficiency and the 
measures it involves: without these, the relative adaptivity of representational and non-
representational decision-makers is difficult to judge. 
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Schulz’s second argument for the adaptivity of cognitive efficiency attempts to show that 
cognitive efficiency correlates with neural efficiency, and that neural efficiency is adaptive. 
Schulz’s key example of neural efficiency is synaptic pruning: the process by which neuronal 
structures decay during development in mammals, including humans. But a reduction in neural 
connections or neural activation does not necessitate an increase in neural efficiency (Poldrack 
2015). Synaptic pruning only leads to increased neural efficiency if its metabolic savings 
outweigh any decrease in performance (according to some quantifiable measure) and/or an 
increase in time; factors which Schulz does not consider. (Schulz also does not establish that 
increased cognitive efficiency causes increased neural efficiency, but rather relies on 
correlational claims from the developmental literature.) Putting these issues aside, we can still 
ask whether neural efficiency is adaptive. As Schulz points out, it is metabolically costly to 
maintain a large brain. If there were increases in neural efficiency associated with synaptic 
pruning, for example, organisms could invest the conserved energy in more adaptive 
enterprises: enhancing other cognitive capacities or, Schulz suggests, just to grow a larger body. 
The adaptivity of increased neural efficiency, however, doesn’t seem to follow automatically. 
Much will depend on what the savings are used for, and how the environment is: a larger body 
is only adaptive in an environment where there is sufficient food to fuel it, for example. 
 
If we allow Schulz his claims that neural efficiency is adaptive, that it is appropriately related to 
cognitive efficiency, and that representational decision-makers are plausibly more cognitively 
efficient than non-representational decision-makers, where does that leave us? Schulz’s project 
starts from the idea that representational decision-making is an adaptation, and concludes that  
natural selection has favored representational decision-making over reflex-driven behavior 
determination in virtue of the fitness benefits from the former’s cognitive efficiency. Schulz 
does not make a lengthy case for taking decision-making to be an adaptation: he proposes that 
“selective explanations of the evolution of this trait should be thought quite plausible” (61) in 
virtue of its widespread nature and complexity. Establishing whether any psychological capacity 
is an adaptation is a thorny issue,  but it is easier where the capacity is associated with a specific 
kind of behavior which can help us to infer the capacity’s function. The supposed adaptivity of 
behaviors like recognizing faces, attributing mental states to others, or detecting social cheating 
are sometimes used to suggest that we have evolved specific psychological capacities with 
these individual functions. General-purpose psychological capacities like decision-making, 
however, do not give rise to any particular kind of behavior: “[t]he function of a general 
cognitive mechanism is complex and indirect […] [n]o particular kind of behaviour is its mark” 
(Sterelny 1992, 171). And notice that if representational decision-making is an adaptation, it 
must at minimum be heritable and confer differential fitness benefits. Schulz makes no mention 
of the heritability of representational decision-making, and denies that its differential fitness 
benefits correspond to specific behaviors: 
“there need not be a fundamental difference in the kinds of things cognitive 
representational decision makers can do (as compared to purely reflex-driven 
organisms) for them to be selected for: a major adaptive benefit of cognitive 
representational decision making lies in its allowing for more efficient behavior 
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generation, and not for its allowing for the generation of new kinds of behaviors” (102-
3) 
Thinking about the adaptivity of decision-making and the role of representational mechanisms 
brings to mind Mayr’s (1961) distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations of traits. 
The ultimate cause of a trait is its evolutionary function (what it has been selected for); the 
proximate cause of a trait is the mechanism that produces it. If we want to explain the human 
ability to recognize familiar faces, for example, then we could specify the adaptive benefits of 
facial recognition (ultimate cause), or focus on the cognitive mechanisms that produce it 
(proximate cause). If we apply Mayr’s distinction to decision-making, then questions about the 
selection pressures under which it evolved would be asking about its ultimate cause, and 
questions about the mechanisms that produce it (representational or otherwise) would be 
asking about its proximate cause. Schulz does not make use of Mayr’s distinction, instead 
making claims which combine aspects of ultimate and proximate causes. He may have good 
reason to do so: several philosophers and scientists have questioned the usefulness of the 
ultimate/proximate distinction when dealing with certain phenomena including psychological 
traits (Laland et al. 2011). It would be interesting to know where Schulz stands on this matter.  
 
I have already suggested that Schulz’s focus on high-level non-perceptual representations is at 
odds with certain approaches to cognitive science. Embodied cognitive science, in particular, 
seems to challenge Schulz’s claims. Proponents of embodied cognitive science reject the idea 
that sensory and motor processes are mere inputs and outputs to a mediating cognitive 
mechanism which is responsible for intelligent behavior. Instead, they argue that closely 
coupled sensory and motor processing can generate flexible behavior without the need for 
high-level mental states, amodal concepts, or inferential reasoning. For example, a female 
cricket’s ability to locate a chirping mate might seem to require calculation and navigation, until 
we realize that the differential placement of its sense organs generates auditory phase patterns 
that guide the cricket toward its mate without any internal representations (Webb 2001). 
Moreover, embodied cognitive science often appeals to evolutionary considerations that favor 
their anti-representational approach, so their view is directly in competition with Schulz’s 
claims about the adaptivity of representationally-driven behavior. Schulz dedicates a chapter of 
his to book to addressing this issue, but focuses on extended cognition rather than embodied 
cognition. Both extended and embodied approaches to cognition reject ‘neurocentric’ 
approaches to the mind, but in different ways: embodied approaches emphasize how bodily 
sensors and effectors can replace representational processing in the brain, while extended 
approaches emphasize how the extra-bodily environment can supplement representational 
processing in the brain. There is thus nothing particularly anti-representational about extended 
cognitive science. In fact, many cases of putative extended cognition involve representational 
artefacts such as linguistic and numerical symbol systems, calendars, smartphones, and 
notebooks. These non-neural vehicles of representation are the reason that extended cognition 
is also known as vehicle externalism. When Schulz (unsurprisingly) concludes that his 
representational approach is consistent with extended cognition, he has done nothing to 
address the embodied theorist’s claim that evolution may have selected for extra-neural and 
non-representational mechanisms of behavior determination.  
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There is much to recommend Efficient Cognition. Schulz’s approach to philosophy is a 
refreshing one: he builds on the strengths of existing accounts instead of demolishing them, 
and he shows how his conclusions support rather than refute the claims of other researchers. 
Schulz distances himself from the controversial and narrow confines of the Evolutionary 
Psychology program, focusing instead on the evidential value of genuinely interdisciplinary 
work. In these respects, Efficient Cognition sets an admirable standard. The concept of cognitive 
efficiency has previously received little philosophical interest, and it is to be hoped that Schulz’s 
book stimulates new work in this area. However, Schulz’s strategy of focusing on the efficiency 
differences between representational and non-representational mechanisms may not be the 
optimal approach. Representations alone are neither efficient nor inefficient: much depends 
whether information is encoded symbolically or non-symbolically, for example, whether 
processing rules are explicitly represented, and how encapsulated cognitive processes are. 
Schulz has little to say on matters of cognitive architecture, other than to claim that his own 
arguments concerning cognitive efficiency are neutral with respect to modular and non-
modular architectures. This seems unlikely: the features of cognition that contribute to 
efficiency (e.g. speed, effort, redundancy) are precisely the kinds of features that differ across 
architectures. There are limits to how much we can expect to learn about cognitive efficiency 
from considering representations in isolation from the cognitive processes operating over 
them, and the cognitive architectures in which they are embedded.  
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